This rule has been changed in England by the "Slander of Women Act," and in Virginia by "The Statute of Insulting Words." Many other states have also passed statutes making actionable *per se,* a charge of unchastity to women.

In other states, even in the absence of statute, the courts have broken away from the harsh rule of the old common law, and declared that false imputation of unchastity to women is actionable *per se. Kelley* v. *Flaherty,* 16 R. I. 234, 27 Am. St. Rep. 739; *Cleveland* v. *Detweiler,* 18 Iowa 299. This rule has sometimes been rested on the ground that an imputation of unchastity is now everywhere treated as the deepest insult and vilest charge that can be inflicted upon a woman, destroying her reputation and chance of self-support. *Battles* v. *Tyson,* 77 Neb. 563, 110 N. W. 299. Other courts have repudiated the old common law rule on the ground that it is not suited to our changed conditions. Originally, in England, one who charged a woman with unchastity was punishable in the ecclesiastical courts, which courts could not award damages at all. However, it had the effect of stripping the common laws courts of jurisdiction, except in cases of special damages. *Cooper* v. *Searvens,* 81 Kan. 267, 105 Pac. 509. And since there are no ecclesiastical courts in this country, some common law courts hold that they have jurisdiction over such offenses. *Smith* v. *Minor,* 1 N. J. L. 16.

Although probably not sustained by the majority of the courts, in the absence of statute, the rule applied in the instant case certainly has the sanction of reason and justice. A woman's reputation for chastity is an asset of inestimable value and its destruction is clearly a wrong for which there ought to be a remedy.

TIME—COMPUTATION OF TIME—FRACTION OF A DAY.—A statute provided that all claims against insolvents must be presented to the assignee under the general assignment within one year from the time that notice was given by the assignee to creditors. A debtor made a general assignment, and notice was given to the creditors on Nov. 11, 1914, at 1:28 p. m. A claim was presented on the forenoon of Nov. 11, 1915. *Held,* the claim is presented within the time required by statute. *In re Vietor,* 166 N. Y. Supp. 1012.

It is a general rule of law that fractions of a day are not to be regarded, but that a day is to be treated as an indivisible portion of time, so that any act done within the compass of it is no more referable to any one part of the day than to any other part of it. *Stuart* v. *Petree,* 138 Ky. 514, 128 S. W. 592. This rule has sometimes been placed upon the ground that the proof of the hour and minute that a particular act is done is likely to be unsatisfactory and to lead to uncertain results. *Griffin* v. *Forrest,* 49 Mich. 309, 13 N. W. 603. Thus, in contracts of hiring, fractions of a day are reckoned as whole days. *Olson* v. *Rushfeldt,* 81 Minn. 381, 84 N. W. 123. Upon this principle, a person has been held to become of age on the first instant of the last day of the twenty-first year next before the anniversary of his birth. *State* v. *Clarke,* 3 Harr. (Del.) 557. Likewise, in the service of process and

notice, fractions of a day are not considered in the computation of time. *Columbia Turnpike Road* v. *Haywood,* 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 422.

However, the rule that a day is an indivisible portion of time is a mere fiction of law. In order to prevent a failure of justice, the courts seem very free in making exceptions, and in allowing the real facts to be shown. Thus, where a deed is recorded on the same day but prior to the entry of a judgment lien, the deed takes priority over the judgment lien. *Murfee's Heirs* v. *Carmack,* 4 Yerger (Tenn.) 270, 26 Am. Dec. 232. And the same rule applies where there is a recordation of a judgment and an appointment of a receiver of an insolvent. *Odell Hardware Co.* v. *Holtmorgan Mills* (N. C.), 92 S. E. 8. In general, where the priority of conflicting claims depends upon the exact hour of the day of filing, fractions of a day are recognized. *Washington Mining Co.* v. *O'Laughlin,* 46 Colo. 503, 105 Pac. 1092. See *Louisville* v. *Savings Bank,* 104 U. S. 469. Courts of bankruptcy seem to invariably recognize fractions of a day. *Westbrook Mfg. Co.* v. *Grant,* 60 Me. 88, 11 Am. Rep. 181. A decree, rendered on the same day but subsequent to the death of the respondent, has been held to be void. *Ex parte Massie,* 131 Ala. 62, 21 South. 483, 90 Am. St. Rep. 20, 56 L. R. A. 671.

The common law rule has no application where a statute expressly requires that notice be taken of the precise time when an official act is done. *Brady* v. *Gilman,* 96 Minn. 234, 104 N. W. 897, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 835, 113 Am. St. Rep. 622.

The general rule seems to be that portions of a day will be reckoned as whole days, except where a statute directs otherwise, or where the parties have agreed otherwise, or where injustice would result from such reckoning.